

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
Washington, D.C.

INTELLIGENCE BRIEF)
NO. 12)

S-Memorandum #5
14 October 1946

PENETRATION OF COMMUNIST PARTIES: PRELIMINARY BRIEF

1. The collection of secret information on the internal organization and covert or semi-covert activities of the major Communist Parties throughout the world has been established as a priority I objective of this agency. This brief outlines the main considerations of operational approach and specific targets involved in obtaining such information, and provides certain briefing materials.

2. For practical purposes the essential elements of information required on individual Communist Parties may be separated into two categories:

a. Information concerning a specific Communist Party (CP) as an overt national political group or party concurrently engaged in covert or subversive activities.

b. Information concerning a specific CP as one section of a covert international organization directed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

3. The intelligence approach to the Communist Party as a national political group involves the accumulation of an extensive amount of detailed information on the organization, political and propaganda activities, outside relationships, front and affiliated organizations, etc., of individual Communist Parties. This information is in large part available from public sources of information, and satisfactory general estimates of the activity, plans, and potential power of the Party can often be made without recourse to additional sources. However, to obtain information on internal Party controls and purges, sources of funds, covert infiltration of other groups and organizations, para-military activities or plans, etc., secret sources are essential.

4. Operational approach: Much of this information is readily procurable from informants not members of the CP, and the great preponderance of reports on the CP received in the past has consisted of reports from the large number of anti-Communist groups and individuals currently active in almost every country, ranging from members of Socialist and right-wing parties, government officials, and business and clerical figures to anti-Soviet emigres and professional informants. These sources provide general

-2-

data on the structure and organization of the Party, the names of leading Communists (occasionally their specific position in the hierarchy) and of CP members in specific areas, the political activities of the Party and its relationship with other parties and non-political groups and organizations, the party-line as it emerges in CP publications and meetings, front organizations through which the Party works, etc. Occasionally these non-CP sources are in a position to supply details on some of these topics or on the CP's relations with members of the Soviet diplomatic or intelligence services, but the extent and precision of their information are sharply limited unless they themselves have managed to penetrate the CP at one level or another.

Low-level penetration of local cells and sections of a CP offers an effective method of procuring precise details on the CP as a national political-subversive organization, to provide the adequate data for analyses of its plans and potential. Penetration at a low level can be carried out on a systematic basis with reasonable ease, but the limitations of the intelligence thus procured must be constantly kept in mind. This intelligence will be of action value to U. S. agencies only for a limited period in specific areas (Germany, Austria, Italy, China, Korea, and Japan). Purely local, low-level CP coverage in other areas, such as France, Italy, the Near East, and Southeast Asia has a small intelligence value.

Low-level penetration operations are now important and feasible in Germany and Austria (Russian and American zones), France, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and Switzerland.

25X1C8a

25X1A6a

5. Information targets: The general aim of low-level penetrations in any area is the elaboration of a precise picture of CP organization and activities by obtaining such information on the following topics as is not available from public sources of information or from the usual State Department sources in the area:

a. Organization

1. Structure

- Names, functions and background of sectional, regional and national party functionaries.
- Location of sectional, regional and national Party offices.
- Precise data on density of cells in industrial and rural areas.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

2. Party control

Directives from high-level offices to lower echelons.
Disciplinary controls (purges, and the reasons there-
for; clandestine surveillance of party members).
Administrative controls.

3. Funds

Origin, administration and amount of available funds.
Party budget.

4. Membership

Strength of active members in industrial and rural
areas.
Strength of non-active members.
Sympathizers among:
Labor circles
Intellectuals and educators
Military and government personnel
Defections and fluctuation of membership; reasons.
Morale and degree of fanaticism of membership.

b. Political Activities

1. Policy and Strategy

Open and secret decisions of Politburo, Central Com-
mittee and Party Conference.
Implementation by lower party echelons.
Success or failure of policies, and ensuring revisio

2. Pressures

Pre-revolutionary activities.
Names and activities of chief organizers of strikes
and other demonstrations.
Agents provocateurs, etc.
Available arms and ammunition.
Military training centers.

c. Relationships

1. Party-Government

Activities of Communist government members.
Front men in government.
Pressures and influence on non-Communist key person-
in government circles.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET CONTROL~~

-4-

2. Party-Labor

Infiltration and domination of Labor Unions and other Labor organizations.
Attitude toward, and method of combatting, Labor opposition.

3. Party-Army

Infiltration of armed forces.
Communist cells and sympathizing members.

4. Party-Minority Groups

Infiltration, or control of dissatisfied racial or colonial minority groups.

5. Party-Church

Methods of neutralization of Church influence.
Use of liberal Church elements.

6. Party-Opposition Parties

Methods of discrediting, intimidating or splitting Opposition parties.
Infiltration of Opposition groups.

d. Affiliated Organizations

1. Structural data on recognizably Communist organizations: Sport Groups, Educational Institutions, etc.
2. Leadership.
3. Activities.

e. Front Organizations

1. Structure of organizations not recognizable as Communist, which are Communist-controlled: Youth Groups, Women's Groups, Charitable Organizations, Cultural Organizations, etc.
2. Mechanics of Communist control.
3. Radius of influence.

~~SECRET CONTROL~~

-5-

f. Clandestine Organizations

1. Revolutionary military cadres.
2. Training.
3. Strength.
4. Probable efficiency.

g. Propaganda

1. Open propaganda

Information on press, publications, radio, film.
Names of chief publishers, propagandists, agitators.
Controls.

2. Clandestine propaganda

Subversive whispering campaigns
Clandestine press, publications, radio, etc.

3. Internal propaganda

Indoctrination schools and personnel; indoctrination
literature.
Morale-building propaganda.

6. Briefing Note: The conduct of low-level penetration operations in an area will be supervised and assisted by the appropriate Foreign Branch in Washington, which will provide the organizational and personality data required by the field. Historical studies of individual CP's are already available on France, Germany, Italy, and the Near East, and in most cases provide adequate background and orientation. In the course of time resumes of current information available on other CP's will be compiled in Washington and forwarded to field stations.

Appended to this brief are two general aids to low-level penetration operations:

(i) "Notes on Low-level Penetration of the Communist Party" based upon the experience of a staff member in conducting such operations in the United States.

(ii) A copy of the English translation of the official History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) which forms the basic text in all CP political training and indoctrination activities throughout the world. The volume's principal importance, for CP members and candidates, lies in the sections on Communist Doctrine as expounded by Lenin and Stalin which are inserted at appropriate points in the historical analysis. Sections of primary importance are: Chap. II, Sec. 2, 4; Chap. III, Sec. 3; Chap. IV, Sec. 2; Chap. VI, Sec. 3.

~~SECRET CONTROL~~

-6-

HIGH-LEVEL PENETRATION:

7. The low-level penetration of the CP and the accumulation of precise details on the national CP's are of secondary importance in a secret intelligence approach to the CP, but they are necessary preliminaries to the effective execution of high-level penetration operations designed to uncover the operational methods, plans and potential effectiveness of the major CP's of the world as key instruments of USSR foreign policy. It can be safely stated that the announced dissolution of the Comintern headquarters in 1943 has had no practical effect upon the organized exploitation of the national CP's of the world by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union-Bolshevik (CPSU(B)) as an important instrument in achieving its political, propaganda, military, and intelligence aims abroad. The careful delineation of the mechanism, methods, and program of this exploitation is a major strategic intelligence objective. The primary strategic target in the CP is the Central Committee and its connections with diplomatic, intelligence and propaganda personnel of the Russian Communist Party and of the Soviet government. The key group in the entire hierarchy is the Apparat, or inner circle of Central Committee members who reportedly carry on the principal contacts with top Comintern and RIS representatives in most countries.

8. Operational Approach: The high-level penetration of the Communist Party presents very difficult operational problems.

25X6D

25X6D

cal statement on possible operational approaches, either on the basis of direct subversion of Central Committee members or the infiltration of agents into District and Federal Committee levels, can be made at present in the light of the current lack of basic facts on CP personnel, organization, and functions at this level for most countries. The initiation of such operations can hardly be anticipated for the near future, but a systematic collection of the data outlined under the preceding paragraph represents an indispensable first step in producing the items of operational intelligence required to plan such operations.

9. Information Targets of such high-level penetration operations are:

a. Identity, biography, personal characteristics, and non-public activities of members of the Central Committee.

b. Functioning of the Apparat.

~~SECRET CONTROL~~

~~SECRET - CONTROL~~

-7-

1. Identity of members.
2. Contacts of members of Apparatus (and of Central Committee) with
 - (1) Comintern foreign representative in area.
 - (2) RJS (esp. MGB) representative in area.
 - (3) Soviet diplomatic or other governmental officials in area.
 - (4) CP intelligence agents at lower levels (not through normal Party channels).

c. Courier relationships between the local Apparatus and the Central Committee and Party sections in Moscow, either directly or through local Comintern or RJS representatives.

1. Identity and routes of couriers.
2. Funds transmitted and purpose.
3. Directives transmitted.
4. Identity and mission of special representatives dispatched from Moscow.

d. Regional meetings of national CP leaders: agenda and decisions.

e. Structure and activity of Moscow "Comintern" headquarters:

1. Personnel
2. Organization
3. Nature and extent of name files
4. Training institutions
5. Precise position in Party bureaucracy

f. Developments in Comintern strategic policy:

1. Texts of directives issued
2. Major policy discussions and decisions
3. Coordination of national CP propaganda with Agitprop Section of the Russian Communist Party.


~~SECRET - CONTROL~~

g. Comintern infiltration and exploitation of all international organizations, including Russian Orthodox Church.

10. Briefing note: In order to facilitate the preliminary collection of operational information on the CP at the strategic level, a series of briefing memoranda will be issued on the following aspects of the Comintern:

- a. History of Comintern Activities
- b. Preliminary Report on the Current Structure and Operations of the Comintern
- c. The CP Apparatus and Illegal CP Activities
- d. The Function of the CP in RIS Activities

APPROVED:


W. W. QUINN
Colonel, Infantry
Director

Attachment I: "Notes on Low-level Penetration of the Communist Party"

Attachment II: History of the CRSU ()

25X1C8a 

25X1C8a

~~SECRET CONTROL~~